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Abstract
The  main  goal  of  this  essay  is  to  provide  microfoundations  in  a  spatial  general  equilibrium
framework  for  the  fact  that  individuals  use  money  to  make  transactions,  and  hence
microfoundations for the cash in advance constraint. We analyze the emergence of a monetary
economy out of a redistribution barter system where goods are sent to a central market and then
redistributed among individuals. We show that, as the population increases beyond a certain
point, the barter exchange system becomes too expensive. To reduce the exchange system cost,
and as a result of individuals’ rational behavior, a new specialized merchant, the carrier, appears
and causes frictions among traders leading to the appearance of money. There are, however,
certain  conditions  for  this  process  to  succeed.  These  conditions  concern  the  economic
characteristics of those goods chosen to act as money, and the level of economic development.
______________________________________
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THE APPEARANCE OF CARRIERS AND THE ORIGINS OF MONEY
Jose Noguera S., CERGE-EI
Socrates:  A city is a response to human needs. No human being is self-sufficient and all of us have many
wants… The origin of every real city is human necessity… The first and greatest necessity is
food… Next a place to live; third, clothing and the like… Then we must ask how our city will
provide these things. A farmer will be needed, and a builder and a weaver as well… Then how
should they proceed? … Should he produce food for his own needs alone devoting only a fourth of
his total effort to that kind of work? Then he could allot the other three-fourth of his time to
building a house, making clothes, and cobbling shoes. Choosing the latter, he wouldn’t have to
bother about associating with others; he could supply his own wants and be his own man.
Adeimantus:  I don’t think he should try to do everything. He should concentrate on producing food.
Socrates:  I agree that this would probably be the better way… We can conclude, then, that production in our
city will be more abundant and the products more easily produced and of better quality if each
does the work nature has equipped him to do, at the appropriate time, and is not required to spend
time  on  other  occupations…  Then  there  will  be  a  market  place  and  money  as  a  medium  of
exchange… Supposing the farmer or other craftsman brings his produce to market but does not
arrive at the same time as those who would buy from him. Would he sit idly in the market place,
wasting time he could otherwise devote to productive work?
Adeimantus:  Not at all. There will be men at the market who will offer their services to remedy the situation by
acting as salesmen…
Socrates:  So the need for money in the exchange of goods produces the class we know as tradesmen.
Plato, The Republic, Book II (369-371)
I. INTRODUCTION
People gather to overcome difficulties. Among these difficulties are people’s needs to protect
themselves from their enemies or the hazards of nature. People also gather to help each other to
build a better life together. One way to attain this goal is by joining efforts to obtain the goods
needed to survive. These ideas were present in Socrates’ mind when he said that “the origin of3
every  real  city  is  human  necessity.”  This  conclusion  also  follows  from  Anas’  (1992)  and,
Berliant and Konishi (2000)’s papers on the economics of city emergence.
The next step in this argument is that, once men decided to live in cities, they realized
that they could better satisfy their needs if they specialized, and the idea of the division of labor
was  also  in  Socrates  and  Adeimantus’  dialog.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  according  to
Socrates, as well as Plato, Aristotle, and likely many other Greek philosophers before them,
specialization  does  not  cause  an  increase  in  efficiency  per  se,  but  is  a  result  of  allowing
everyone to specialize in what each finds more suitable, as emphasized in Schumpeter (1954,
pg. 56). The reasoning continues by arguing that specialization brings the need of exchange,
and difficulties in exchange are overcome by money.
The influence of these ideas survived in Smith (1776) in his chapters on the division of
labor and the origin of money. As the Greek philosophers did more than two thousand years
ago,  Smith  (1776)  argues  that  difficulties  in  exchange  came  from  the  lack  of  a  double
coincidence of  wants,  and  that  money  appeared  to  resolve  these  frictions.  A  century  later,
Jevons (1875) again strongly emphasizes this idea. Menger (1892) stresses the use of money as
a medium of exchange. He also points out three other important  features. The first is that
people accept money as long as others do as well. The second is that the appearance of money
was an evolutionary process involving a learning process through several generations, and the
third one is that this evolutionary process was the result of individuals’ attempts to maximize
their utilities.
For many years, after this literature, no important essay on the origins of money was
written  based  on  the  “absence  of  a  double  coincidence  of  wants”  idea,  until  Jones  (1976)
developed  a  model  based  on  Menger’s  ideas.  Assuming  the  existence  of  a  specialized
economy,  Jones’  model  states  that  each  individual  produces  only  one  good  and  wants  to4
consume a bundle of goods. To obtain this bundle, the individual “randomly searches” for one
other individual wanting to exchange the good that he produces for the bundle that he needs.
Random matching is the key assumption used by Jones (1976) to generate money based on the
idea of the absence of a double coincidence of wants. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) sets up a
random matching model in which several objects are potential mediums of exchange, but only
one of them, based on its physical properties, is ultimately chosen for that role. More recently,
Wallace (1997) presented a random matching model explaining the coexistence of money with
higher return assets, and the short run real effects of a change in the quantity of money.
Although  this  logically  well-structured  theory,  based  on  the  random  matching
assumption, is able to explain many facts about monetary economies, it misses a couple of
ideas already present in Socrates and Adeimantus’ dialogue. The first is the existence of a city
where  people  gather  and  exchange  the  goods  they  need.  The  other  is  the  presence  of
middlemen to resolve frictions caused by the lack of a double coincidence of wants. If each
individual produces only one  good,  then  nobody  but  a  middleman  has  a  bundle  of  goods.
However, people usually know who and  where  the  middleman  is,  so if  so me o n e  n e e d s to
barter, he simply needs to visit the middleman. In that case, there is no random matching.
Noguera (2000) sets up a spatial general equilibrium model to analyze the evolution of barter
economies,  and  shows  some  circumstances  under  which  a  barter  economy  with  a  double
coincidence  of  wants  problem  evolves  to  a  more  sophisticated  barter  system  in  which  the
appearance of central merchants overcome the frictions created by the specialization process.
Historians and anthropologists have found many elements supporting the importance of
these two factors in the genesis of money. For example, Renfrew and Bahn (1996, pg. 351–
353) argue that once the economy reaches a minimum level of technical progress, the division
of labor and barter intensifies together in a system in which commodities travel “Down-the-5
Line”. At the beginning, there is no middleman and no money and individuals meet randomly.
But when individuals learn how to locate each other, a more systematic barter starts. This
barter economy begins, first, as a reciprocity system in the way of exchanges of gifts among
people well known to each other in well-defined contexts. Over time, a redistribution system
with centralized and traveling merchants or peddlers emerges. Frequently, goods are sent to a
market center and then redistributed. Individuals produce one or a few goods but consume
many. In the redistribution system, exchange operates better than in an unstructured barter,
overcoming the absence of the double coincidence of wants problem. In all likelihood money
appears  under  this  system.  This  view  has  been  widely  accepted  by  anthropologists  after
Polanyi’s (1957) “The Economy as Instituted Process” article. It is also supported by Einzig
(1966)’s famous book on primitive money. In fact, as Laidler (1997, pg. 1920) asserts: “The
basic insight about the role of mutually consistent beliefs in supporting monetary exchange
yielded by models like that of Kiyotaki and Wright is therefore important, even though such
models seem incapable of getting the grips with the historical emergence of money.”
An important point that remains to be ascertained about the genesis of money is the
circumstance under which money arose out of a redistribution system. Hicks (1989) suggests that
people made credit arrangements facilitated by a unit of account and that this unit of account
eventually emerged as a medium of exchange. On the other hand, Clower (1995) asserts that, as
an economy grew, merchants obtained benefits by becoming specialized traders, causing frictions
among  individuals  that  were  resolved  with  the  use  of  a  medium  of  exchange.  Nevertheless,
neither author says anything about the object that became money, the circumstances that made it
possible for this object to appear, or the conditions under which a monetary economy dominates
a barter economy.6
The main goal of this essay is to provide microfoundations for the fact that individuals
use money to make transactions, and hence microfoundations for the cash in advance constraint.
We  use  a  spatial  general  equilibrium  framework  to  analyze  the  emergence  of  a  monetary
economy out of a redistribution barter system in which goods are sent to a central market and
then redistributed among individuals. We show that, as the population increases beyond to a
certain point, the barter exchange system becomes too expensive. To reduce the exchange system
cost, and as a result of individuals’ rational behavior, a new specialized merchant, the carrier,
appears  and  causes  frictions  among  traders,  leading  to  the  appearance  of  money.  There  are,
however, certain conditions for this process to succeed. These conditions concern the economic
characteristics of those goods chosen to act as money, and the level of economic development.
We set up a spatial general equilibrium model in which goods differ in their perishability
rate and transportation cost. It will be shown that, under some circumstances, goods with the
lowest  transportation  cost  arise  endogenously  as  money.  This  will  be  a  consequence  of  the
relationship  between  their  physical  properties  and  individuals’  optimization  behavior.  Jevons
(1875, pg. 31) gives a long list of the properties of those objects used as money. We assume here
that each good is homogeneous, cognizable and divisible. The other properties given by Jevons
are described by two variables: transportation cost and perishability rate. Portability is measured
by transportation costs, stability of value and indestructibility by perishability, and non-monetary
utility by the importance of goods in the utility function. The only reason to assume that all goods
are equally homogeneous, cognizable and divisible but may differ in their portability, stability of
value, indestructibility, and utility, is that the former characteristics are concerned mainly with
physical properties, and the latter ones have an economic meaning.
The environment assumed here is a city in which specialized producers trade to acquire
goods for consumption. There is a production technology and exchange is costly. Individuals do7
not trust each other and act in their own interest to maximize their utilities. Each individual
produces only one good that he wants to exchange for many others. Townsend (1989) also sets
up a model with “spatially separated agents”. In his models, however, there are no spatial costs
like transportation or storage costs, and money is exogenously determined.
In  Section  II,  we  set  up  a  spatial  general  equilibrium  model  to a n a l y z e  b a r t e r
redistribution economies and use it as a framework to analyze barter redistribution economies. In
this spatial model, exchange is done through centralized merchants. Goods are sent to a central
market and then redistributed among individuals wanting to consume the most goods available.
As emphasized by Ostroy and Starr (1990), to trade successfully, individuals pay transaction
costs, which include transportation, meeting, and search costs. Goods perish at some specific rate
and trade is still made through barter.
In Section III, we determine the conditions under which an object emerges as a medium
of exchange. We prove that, as the scope of the economy grows and under certain technological
conditions, it is profitable for some individuals to become carriers. This new specialist and the
absence of trust cause frictions among individuals that are solved by bringing money about. It
also causes the economy to grow beyond the limitations of a barter economy. It is noteworthy
that money appears as a consequence of individuals’ optimization decisions and that individuals
decide which object will be used as money.
In Section IV, we set up a monetary general equilibrium model in which carriers allow
producers to save transportation cost and increase their production. In Section V, we analyze the
conditions  under  which  this  monetary  economy  dominates  over  the  barter  economy  with
merchants. We prove that the emergence of money contributes to growth by lowering transaction
costs and inducing the creation of new goods. Also, an economy with a more diverse set of goods8
creates conditions in which money becomes more desirable from a social point of view. Finally,
we conclude in Section VI.
II. THE BARTER ECONOMY WITH MERCHANTS
Assumptions of the Model
Consider a “long narrow city” on an interval [-g, g], so the city size is 2g. There is a continuum
of individuals of Lebesgue measure N living in that city that specialize in either production or
exchange activities. Assume that every individual is endowed with one unit of time, and that
there is a Central Business District (CBD) located at the center of the city, where individuals
physically meet for barter purposes.
Producers specialize in producing only one good at their locations that can be totally
different or simply differentiated from all others. Merchants produce nothing but devote their
whole time availability to facilitating exchanges.
Assume that there are F merchants located inside the CBD. Producer i is located at a
distance i away from the CBD. He can be identified by his location in the city, and hence, by
the good that they produce. Therefore, there are 2g individuals, and
N  = 2g  +  F.( 1 )
Merchants are busy and centralized. A centralized merchant means that the merchant receives the
producer’s production and exchanges it for all other consumption goods, that is, the merchant
receives the only good that the producer offers and gives him a “basket” of the 2g goods existing
in the economy.
A busy merchant means that the merchant spends his whole time  wi t h  t w o  k i n d s  o f
exchange activities. The first activity is to exchange with producers. After a producer drops the
goods off at a warehouse, the merchant has to do inventory, etc. Let η be this amount of time.
The second kind of activity is the time that every merchant spends dealing with other merchants.9
Since there are F centralized merchants that exchange all consumption goods for only one good
with the producer, each merchant obtains directly from the producer, at most, 2g/F goods. To
acquire all other goods that he needs to exchange with the producer, the merchant must deal with
other merchants to purvey their storage. Assume that in doing this, he must meet every other
merchant, and let ϕ be the average amount  of  time  that  a  merchant  spends  looking  for  and
meeting all other merchants. Hence, all merchants’ time availability is 2g η + F ϕ. On the other
hand, since every merchant is endowed with one unit of time, all merchants together have F units
of time available. Therefore,
F = 2g η + F ϕ.  (2)
Let C
i(j) be the individual i’s consumption of good j, and assume that individual i (located at i)






i i i dj j C Log j C U   ) ( )) ( (( 3 )
where  is the Lebesgue integral operator. In consequence, every individual wants to consume
some of every good j, but not the entire production of j. Therefore, the coincidence of wants is
incomplete and i must trade the rest of his production with other individuals until he acquires all
the goods that he needs.
Suppose also that every good produced belongs to one of the following sets
Λ = {x ∈ [-g, g] such that it has a perishability rate δ0 and a transportation cost τ} or
Φ = {x ∈ [-g, g] such that it has a perishability rate δ1 and a transportation cost τ1 = 0}.
The transportation cost τ is defined in units of time per unit of distance. Notice also that the set
{Λ, Φ} is a partition of the interval [-g, g]. Assume also that the set Φ is of measure zero. We
interpret this in the following way: goods in the set Φ constitute a group small enough so that its10
size is insignificant in comparison with the whole economy. The aggregate production and the
quantity of goods in the set Φ, however, are not zero.
Assume that every producer has the following production function q = AL, where q is
production, L is the amount of labor measured in units of time, and A is a constant representing
the production technology. Every individual i is endowed with a fixed amount of time available
for production and exchange activities which we normalize to one.
The producer located at i works Li hours to produce qi. At the end of the period, he
transports the merchandise to the CBD. Since the distance from location i to the CBD is its
absolute value, it results the following constraint:
Li + τi i = 1.
When the producer arrives at the CBD he finds his merchandize perished at a rate δi. Then, he
barters the remaining merchandise with a merchant in exchange for consumption goods. Assume,
for simplicity, that the time spent by the producer exchanging with the merchant is insignificant,
so we set it to zero.
Producer  i  sells  his  whole  production  to  the  merchant  for  a  price  Pi,  and  buys  the
consumption goods he needs for a price  ξPi, where ξ is  the  merchant’s  markup.  Hence,  his
problem is to maximize the utility function (3) subject to the following budget constraints:
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On the other hand, assume that the F merchants are identical. They buy an amount (1 - δi) qi from
producer i for a price Pi, and sell it for a markup ξPi. Assume also that every merchant sets his
own  markup  and  knows  the  markup  set  by  all  other  merchants.  Assuming  a  competitive
equilibrium, all merchants will set the same markup, and therefore, all merchants will have the11
same  profits,  so  we  can  obtain  every  individual  merchant’s  profit  by  finding  the  average
merchant profits.
Notice that, from every good j, merchants obtain a net profit equal to (ξ − 1)(1 – δj)Pjqj
that  they  spend  buying  their  own  consumption  goods.  Hence,  merchant  f  ‘ s  p r o b l e m  i s  t o
maximize the utility function (3) subject to the budget constraint
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Finally, assume that individuals do not incur any cost to transport himself or the consumption
goods back home.
Equilibrium
Definition: Consider a long  narrow city  of size 2g, with N  individuals,  the  preference  order
implied by (1), a parameter set {δ0, δ1, τ, η, ϕ, A}, and a production function qi = AiLi. We define
an equilibrium in this Barter Economy with Merchants (BEM) as the set {C
i(j), C
f(j), Li, Pi, ξ, 2g,
F} for i, j ∈ [-g, g], f ∈ [0, F] such that the following conditions hold:
1)  Every producer maximizes (3) subject to constraints (4).
2)  Every merchant maximizes (3) subject to constraint (5).
3)  Good  i’s  production  offered  for  barter  in  every  period  t e q u a l s  t h e  a g g r e g a t e
consumption for this good during this period. That is,
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for   all k ∈ Φ.12
4)  Every  individual  chooses  the  occupation  that  is  most  convenient  for  him,  that  is,
individuals choose between being merchants or producers.
5)  Producers and merchants are busy, that is, they spend their whole time availability
producing and exchanging goods.
Equilibrium  condition  (3)  allows  us  to  find  producers’  equilibrium  prices,  and  equilibrium
condition (4) to find the equilibrium markups. Finally, the equilibrium condition (5) allow us to
determine the number of merchants and producers, so these two variables become endogenous.
Theorem 1: In a BEM, the equilibrium number of producers and merchants are






















Proof: Comes directly from solving 2g and F in (1) and (2).
From Theorem 1 it follows that the equilibrium number of merchants decreases if merchants
spend  less  time  either  bartering  with  producers  or  among  them,  that  is,  if  the  exchange
technology employed by the merchant improves.
Theorem  2:  In  equilibrium,  the  BEM  has  the  following  equilibrium  prices,  markup  and
consumption functions:
Pk = 1  if k ∈ Φ, (6a)
k








1 if k ∈ Λ, (6b)
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Proof: From the producer and the merchant’s maximization problems, we find the following
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and that
Pj C
i(j) = Pk C
i(k) for  i, j, k ∈ [-g, g]. (7d)
Let’s first find the producers’ equilibrium prices. Assume first that k ∈ Φ. From equilibrium
condition (3) we have that








δ − − ξ
+
ξ
τ − δ −
Λ Λ ] , 0 [
0 0 ) (
2
) 1 )( 1 (
2
















= dj P j H
gH







Since Pk does not depend on location k if k ∈ Φ, and all are identical, we can choose goods in Φ
as numeraire so that Pk = 1  if k ∈ Φ and (6a) follows. Using this and (7d), we divide (7a) by
(7b), to find (6b). On the other hand, from equilibrium condition (4) producers may become
merchants if merchants’ utility is higher and vice-versa. Thus, in equilibrium, the utility level for
all individuals must be equal. A sufficient condition for this is that C
i(k) = C
f(k) for every k ∈ Λ.
Then (6c) follows functions (7a, b, c) and Theorem 1. Finally, substituting (6a, b, c) into (7a, b,
c) we obtain individual consumption functions (7d) and (7e).
Q.E.D14
Equation (6c) shows that the equilibrium markup is one plus the ratio between the time spent by
the merchant for meeting one producer and his total time availability to meet with producers.
This ratio is the profit obtained by the merchant for facilitating the exchange of one unit of
production.  Notice  that  the  equilibrium  markup  decreases  as  the  merchant’s  technology  for
transactions improves, that is, as ϕ or η decreases.
Observe that all individuals consume the same quantity of a particular good k ∈ Λ and the
same quantity of all goods k ∈ Φ. This means that the total production of every good available
for consumption is distributed equally among the whole population, and does not depend on the
merchant’s cost.
Welfare Analysis
In equilibrium, the utility level is the same for all individuals. Hence, if we consider any welfare
function in which all individuals are treated equally, and social welfare is an increasing function
of any one individual’s utility, then a welfare optimum is reached by maximizing the equilibrium
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Let’s denote α = (1 – ϕ)/(1 – ϕ + η), then 2g = α N. Hence, using this and Theorem 2, we can
rewrite the welfare function for the BEM as
{}
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where a0 = (1 – δ0)A is a technological parameter. Notice that individuals’ welfare increases as
the exchange technology that the merchant uses improves, so ϕ and η decrease. It also increases
as  the  transportation  cost  decreases.  This  means  that  there  is  a  strong  relationship  between
transaction costs and individuals’ welfare.15
Theorem 3: In a BEM, the population is bounded by 2/ατ, and the scope of the economy by 2/τ.
Proof: From the welfare function, we can directly check that the welfare function is defined only
for N less than 1/ατ, and considering that 2g = αN, the scope of the economy is bounded by 2/τ.
Q.E.D.
From Theorem 3 follows that the number of goods cannot grow to more than 2/τ, and population
to  more  than  2/ατ.  The  reason  is  that,  if  the  number  of  goods  grows  beyond  that  point,
transportation costs would not allow enough time for the production of those goods at their
distant locations.
Theorem 4: In the BEM, Wf tends to zero as N tends to zero, it tends to a positive number as N
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Proof: Taking the limits as N tends to zero, and as it tends to 1/τ, we can easily check that Wf
tends to zero, and to (Log(α a0) – 1), which is positive if the technology parameter a0 is high
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N** follows from solving the equation WBEM(N) = 0. Finally, note that N** < 1 < 1/τ.
Q.E.D.
Using the information provided by theorems 3 and 4, the welfare function can be drawn as shown
in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1 COMES HERE16
It is noteworthy to make several comments about the barter economy with merchants. First, note
that  centralized  merchants  allow  overcoming  the  absence  of  a  double  coincidence  of  wants
problem without the need to evolve into a monetary economy.
Second, since the producer does not need to spend time looking for other producers for
bartering, he devotes more time to producing. On the other hand, they must give up a share of
their production to the merchant who facilitates exchange activities.
Third, both producers and merchants consume the same amount of  a good. This is a
consequence of the utility function, in which all consumption goods have the same weight, and
the assumption that every individual chooses the most convenient occupation.
Fourth, notice that goods in Φ are chosen as numeraire since all of them have the same
price. Notice also that prices in the set Λ reflect only the transportation cost (τ) and the markup
(ξ) reflects the exchange cost.
Fifth, the city size cannot grow to more than 2/τ goods. The limitation comes because the
transportation cost to the CBD makes it impossible to produce beyond a radius of 1/τ.
III. CARRIERS AND THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF MONEY
Suppose that there are economies of scale in transportation that allow lowering the unit cost of
transportation from the place of production to the central merchant. A carrier, for example, can
visit all producers in the same trip. This is an incentive for someone to become a carrier or
“peddler merchant”. If the producer can lower his transportation cost, he will specialize even
more and have more time and resources available for production. In this way, he can increase his
consumption  and  utility  level.  On  the  other  hand,  since  he  obtains  benefits  from  lowering
transportation costs, he is willing to pay a carrier a fee for transporting his production to the
CBD. However, as Gale (1978) emphasizes, there is one inconvenience: the producer does not
trust the carrier. Now, the carrier does not own the consumption goods that the producer needs.17
Hence, in order for the carrier to acquire the producer’s output he must give the producer “some
other good” in exchange. Wang (1998) also uses a  spatial  framework  to  show  that  frictions
among traders bring money about as the market decentralizes.
The carrier can pay the producer by using a good in the set Λ or a good in the set Φ.
Suppose first that the producer produces a good in the set Λ, then he will not be willing to spend
time exchanging his production for other goods with the same characteristics since he will face
the same perishability rate and transportation costs. Nevertheless, he will accept in exchange a
good in the set Φ as long as the profit of accepting this good is greater than that of his original
production. Let πΛ
i be producer i’s profit if he accepts payments in terms of a good in Λ, and πΦ
i
if he accepts payments in terms of a good in Φ. Then:
πΛ
i = (1 - δ0) (1 - τi) APi and πΦ
i = (1- δ1) APi.
The first equation is the value of producer i’s profit of the Λ good, were he to decide not to deal
with carriers, and the second equation, were he to decide to do it, both measured in units of Φ
goods. In that case i will not have to travel and can produce more by placing more time into
production. Then, the producer will accept the carrier’s offer if πΦ
i > πΛ
i, that is:
(1- δ1) > (1 - δ0) (1 - τi). (10)
Note that, because of the income effect, if the inequality (10) holds, the producer’s utility is also
higher were the producer to accept the carrier’s offer. However, the producer now assumes a
perishability cost for holding Φ goods. Suppose that goods in Φ are gold and silver, so δ1 = 0. At
this point the reader may think that gold and silver have some transportation costs that we do not
include here, but the important point is that these costs are very low, and I ignore them in this
model, assuming that they are zero. Then, inequality (10) clearly holds and the producer will
accept the carrier’s offer. Note that even if δ1 > 0, there is room for a Φ good to become the
medium of exchange as long as condition (10) holds. In fact, we find many examples of primitive18
economies using goods other than metals as mediums of exchange. Examples of these are the
rice standard in the Philippines, feather money in Santa Cruz, coconuts in the Nicobars, grains in
India, and barley in Babylon and Assyria. Many more examples are found in Einzig (1966).
Assume now that δ0 = δ1, then transportation cost is the determinant variable for the
appearance of goods as mediums of exchange. The only requirement is that the good used as a
medium of exchange be very light. In the rest of the essay, we are going to assume that the goods
chosen as money are very durable metals as gold or silver so as their perishability rate is zero,
that is, δ0 = 0. Therefore, if this monetary system dominates the barter economy with merchants,
it would be optimal to use a medium of exchange to acquire consumption goods. This conclusion
allows us to use the cash in advance constraint (CIA): individuals use money to buy goods. This
constraint is frequently criticized because money is imposed and the constraint does not specify
clearly the exact role of money (see for example Walsh (1998), pg. 118). In this model, however,
we will see that money emerges endogenously as a consequence of individuals’ maximization
behavior.
Assume now that the producer deals with the carrier. Hence, the carrier will assume the
transportation cost and own the merchandise that the central merchant needs. Assume also that
the carrier transports the merchandise and sells it to the merchant at the beginning of the period.
Then, the merchant must assume the perishability costs.
On  the  other  hand,  what  happens  with  those  producing  the  Φ  goods?  They  have  no
interest  in  exchanging  with  a  carrier  and  hence,  they  will  keep  bartering  with  the  central
merchant.  On  the  other  hand,  producers  of  Φ  goods  are  natural  candidates  to  become
intermediaries. Davies (1995) and Ederer (1964) give examples in which goldsmiths decided to
specialize in lending and became bankers during the Middle Ages.19
IV. THE MONETARY ECONOMY WITH CARRIERS
Assumptions of the Model
Assume  that  there  is  a  monetary  economy  with  carriers  that  behave  in  the  following  way:
producer i sells his production to a carrier at a price P, so producers now can spend their whole
time availability on production activities because they no longer need to engage in transport.
Assume that the carrier buys the producers’ output early within the period and transports the
merchandise in such a way that the merchant assumes the perishability cost. The carrier sells to a
central  merchant  the  goods  brought  from  location  i  for  a  markup  γ,  and  incurs  a  unit
transportation  cost  τ.  This  transportation  cost  reflects  both  time  and  operational  costs.  For
simplicity, I will assume that both are equal. Finally, central merchants sell consumption goods
to both producers and carriers for a markup ξ. As assumed before, individuals incur no cost of
transporting themselves and bringing the consumption goods back to home. Notice that goods
belonging to the set Φ are used mainly as mediums of exchange, so we can refer to them as
money.
FIGURE 2 COMES HERE
In this economy, all individuals demand money to facilitate transactions. The flow of goods and
money is shown in Figure 2. Notice that, unlike the merchant barter economy, in this Monetary
Economy with Carriers all producers charge the same price because all of them have the same
productive structure, use carriers and hence, incur no transportation cost. Each producer now has
his whole time available for production. His production is now A units of good i, that he sells to
the carrier at a price P. This means that he demands AP units of goods in Φ from the carrier in
exchange  for  his  production.  That  is,  he  demands  AP  units  of  money.  Since  there  are  2g
producers, then aggregate producers’ demand for money is 2gAP. Let Q denote the aggregate
production of goods, then Q = 2gA and producers demand PQ units of money from carriers in20
exchange for their production, to buy merchants’ consumption goods. Let M
 p denote producers’
aggregate  demand  for  money,  that  is  Φ  goods,  then,  since  there  is  no  capital  accumulation,
producers maximize their utility if they use all the money to buy as much consumption goods as
they can. Hence,
PQ dk k C P M
g
g
p p = ξγ = 
−
) ( (11)
where now the subscript “p” represents producers. The reason for this change in notation is that i
represents a specific location and now all producers charge the same prices, regardless of their
location.
Carriers  demand  γPQ  units  of  money  from  merchants  in  exchange  for  producers’
production and charge a fee γ. For their intermediary services, carriers obtain a monetary profit of
(γ - 1) per unit of good sold to merchants that they use to buy merchants’ consumption goods. Let
M
 τ denote carriers’ aggregate demand for money then, as in the former case, carriers will buy as
many consumption goods and sell as much merchandize as they can buy, so
PQ dk k C P PQ M
g
g
γ = ξγ + = 
−
τ τ ) ( . (12)
To pay the carrier, the merchant sells consumption goods to individuals. Notice that carriers and
producers pay an amount of γPQ units of money in exchange for consumption goods. On the
other  hand,  merchants  buy  themselves  the  consumption  goods  that  they  need,  assume  the
perishability cost and charge a markup ξ. Let M
 f denote merchants’ aggregate demand for money,
and we have
PQ dk k C P PQ M
g
g
f f ξγ δ − = ξγ + γ = 
−
) 1 ( ) ( 0 . (13)21
To collect the merchandize, carriers make only one trip in which they go to every location of the
city. Starting at the CBD located at the center of the city, carriers go until location g visiting
every other location on the way and come back to the CBD with the merchandize. After that, they
go until location –g and do the same. In this way they have economies of scale in transportation
cost. Hence, carriers spend their time traveling a distance equivalent to the city size, 2g, to meet
2g producers. They also meet F merchants to sell the merchandise, so their time constraint is:
T = 2g τ + (F + 2g)η. (14)
The  reader  may  think  that  a  particular  carrier  only  needs  to  visit  those  producers  that  will
exchange with him or her, which is a number less than 2g. However, for mathematical simplicity,
we assume that they visit every producer. This assumption will not affect any important result.
Merchants also meet producers and carriers to sell them consumption goods. They also
look for and meet other merchants to supply their own storage.  Hence,
F = η (T + 2g) + ϕ F. (15)
Observe  also  that  equations  (11),  (12)  and  (13)  represent  budget  constraints  for  producers,
carriers and merchants respectively. This allows us to define equilibrium.
Equilibrium
Definition:  Given  a  long  narrow  city  of  size  G  with  N  individuals,  a  utility  function  U
i,  a
parameter set {δ0, δ1, τ, h and Ai}, and a production function qi = AiLi, equilibrium allocation in
the Monetary Economy with Carriers (MEC) is given by the set {C
p(j), C
τ(j), C
f(j), Li, P, γ, ξ, G,
F} for i, j ∈ [-g, g] and f ∈ [0, F] such that the following conditions hold:
1)  Every producer maximizes utility function (3) subject to constraint (11).
2)  Every carrier maximizes utility function (3) subject to constraint (12).
3)  Every merchant maximizes utility function (3) subject to constraint (13).22
4)  The good k market, for every k ∈ Λ, must be in equilibrium at every period t, that is,
good k aggregate consumption equals good k production:
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5)  The monetary market is in equilibrium, that is M = M
d, where M is the total amount of
money or the production of goods in the set Φ.
6)  Every  individual  chooses  the  occupation  that  is  most  convenient f o r  h i m ,  t h a t  i s ,





7)  Producers,  carriers  and  merchants  are  busy,  that  is,  they  spend  their  whole  time
availability producing, transporting and exchanging goods.
Note that, in the monetary market equilibrium condition, I do not consider individuals’ demand
for consumption for those goods in the set Φ. The reason for this is that, by definition, this is a
set of measure zero, so we can ignore it in the equilibrium conditions.
On the other hand, from equilibrium condition (6), in equilibrium, all individuals reach
the same utility level. Hence C
p(j) = C
τ(j) = C
f(j), and the left hand of the general equilibrium
condition (16) becomes
2g C
p(j) + T C
τ(j) + F C
f(j) =  (1 - δ0)qk.
This means that the equilibrium condition 4, equation (16), is redundant since it is a consequence
of the assumption that every individual chooses the occupation most convenient for him and the
utility maximizing behavior of all individuals.
Theorem 5: The economy’s GDP (Y) is
Y = [γ + (1 - δ0) (ξ −1)] Q (17)
and the following quantitative equation holds:23
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Proof: From (11), (12) and (13), notice that producers contribute to the aggregate production with
Q, carriers with (γ - 1)Q and merchants with (1 - δ0)(ξ - 1)Q, respectively. Adding these three
terms we obtain (17).
Observe that the term ξγP represents the consumer price index. Let’s denote it by Pf.
Adding  (11),  (12)  and  (13)  we  obtain  the  aggregate  demand  for  money.  If  we  denote  the






 and we obtain (18).
Q.E.D.
Equation (15) constitutes a quantitative equation of money. It can be easily checked that the
velocity of money is an increasing function of both merchants and carriers’ markup and the
depreciation rate. The reason is that a higher markup implies a higher transaction of money, and a
higher depreciation rate implies using more money in exchange for each unit of production.
Theorem 6: In an MEC, the equilibrium numbers of producers, carriers and merchants are
2g* = µN,w h e r e
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Proof: The proof comes directly by solving (14), (15), and the fact that N = 2g + T + F.
Taking  derivatives  in  equations  (19),  it  is  easy  to  verify  that  the  number  of  producers  is  a
decreasing function of η, ϕ and τ. The number of merchants is an increasing function of the
average time that a merchant spends meeting producers and carriers (η), and the average time a24
merchant spends looking for and meeting all other merchants (ϕ). However, it does not depend
on the transportation cost (τ).
Taking partial derivatives in (19b) with respect to τ and ϕ we find out that ∂T*/∂τ > 0 and
∂T*/∂ϕ < 0. Hence, the number of carriers is an increasing function of the transportation cost and
a decreasing function of the meeting cost. Nevertheless, the effect of an increase in the average
time spent in meetings on the number of carriers is not clear. However, if we neglect the terms
ητ, ηϕ, τϕ, and the squares of η, ϕ and τ, which are very small terms, we obtain ∂T*/∂η > 0,
which is clearly positive.
Theorem 7: Consider a Monetary Economy with Merchant. In equilibrium, we can set all good
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Proof: From the producer, carrier and merchant’s maximization problem, we obtain the following
demand functions for any consumption good k:
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0         for any merchant f. (21c)25
Since all individuals have the same equilibrium utility level, U
i = U
τ = U
f, each of them has the
same income, and C
p(k) = C
τ(k) = C
f(k). Using this system of equations and the demand functions
(21) we find (20a) and (20b). Finally, plugging (20a, b) in any of the (21) functions we get (20c).
Q.E.D.
It is directly observed that the carrier’s markup is an increasing function of transportation costs.
Taking derivatives of (20a) with respect to τ, η and ϕ, we obtain that the carrier’s markup (γ*) is
an increasing function with respect to any of these variables. Therefore, the carrier’s markup is an
increasing function of any transaction cost. This is because the role of the carrier is that of an
intermediary facilitating transactions.
On the other hand, taking derivatives of (20b), we observe that the merchant markup is an
increasing function of η, ϕ and δ0. This means that the merchant markup is also an increasing
function of all transaction costs involved in his work as intermediary, that is, ϕ, η and δ0. In other
words, both the time spent in meetings (η) and the searching cost (ϕ) cause an increase in both
the carriers’ and merchants’ markup.
Finally,  consumption  is  an  increasing  function  of  production  technology  and  good  k
production  is  distributed  equally  among  all  individuals,  regardless  of  their  occupation.  This
allows us to drop the superscript in the consumption function.
V. THE MONETARY AND THE BARTER ECONOMIES COMPARED
As in the BEM, we use (8) as the welfare function. Then, using (20c), we can write the welfare
function for the MEC as
WMEC(N) = µN[Log(1 – δ0) A – Log N] (22)
where µ is defined in (19a). From (22) we obtain the social welfare function in terms of the
production technology, the depreciation rate, transaction costs, and population.26
Taking derivatives of (22) with respect to N, we find that WMEC is a concave function that
achieves a maximum as N = (1 – δ)A/e, where e is the Neper number.
Notice that, unlike the barter economy with merchants, in this monetary economy with
carriers, transaction costs do not impose any limitation to production other than the carrier’s
capacity to transport production to the CBD. The city population, however, cannot grow to more
than (1 – δ)A, so WMEC looks like it is shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3 COMES HERE
Let’s now compare the welfare function in the monetary economy with carrier and that of the
barter economy with merchants. Consider the difference ∆W = WMEC – WBEM. This difference is
positive,  the  MEC  dominates  the  BEM  and  the  monetary  economy.  Otherwise,  the  BEM
dominates and no money is present. From (8’) and (22), this difference can be written as
τ ∆W(a0, N) = ταN + (α – µ) τN [LogN – Loga0] + (2 – ταN) Log(1 – ταN/2).
Since τ, α, and µ are exogenously determined, the sign of ∆W depends of the population size, N,
and the technological parameter, a0. Using (7) and (19a), we can check that
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Doing some algebra it can be shown that this expression is non-negative if 1 – ατN/2 ≥ e
–µτN / 2
.
But this happens somewhere in the interval 0 < N < 2/ατ. Then, ∆W is an concave function with
respect to N.27
Let’s denote by K0 the technological level at the moment when the man specializes and
hence starts to exchange. Then, we can use Figure 4 to understand the transition from a BEM to
an MEC. Below the horizontal line K0, the man has not specialized yet, there is no trade and city
size can increase indefinitely. The curve AB represents the locus ∆W = 0. Above this curve, the
BEM dominates the MEC. The BEM cannot grow beyond N = 2/ατ. Consequently, the BEM
prevails  in  the  upper  area  of  the  curve  K0ABC,  and  beyond  that  population  size,  the  MEC
prevails.
FIGURE 4 COMES HERE
There are several facts that are worthy to note in comparing the BEM and the MEC. In time, both
technology  and  population  increase,  so  once  the  man  achieves  a  technological  level  K0,  the
transition to a specialized economy follows one of the arrows, v1, v2, or v3. For small economies,
the arrow v1 shows that it is optimal to evolve to a BEM. However, as the population increases,
arrows v2 and v3 show that the MEC dominates the BEM. Notice that arrow v2 shows that the
transition path can go from a primitive communal system to an MEC and after to a BEM. In any
case, arrow v4 shows that the economy eventually evolves to an MEC, as population increases.
This explains why we find some very primitive societies that evolve directly to some kind of
monetary economy and some others, which were even more advanced, like ancient Egypt and the
Incas in Peru, that took more time to take this step. It also explains why, during the hyperinflation
episode in Germany, where millions of people and different goods interact, people did not return
to a barter economy, but they used many goods sharing some physical characteristics, that is Φ
goods, as mediums of exchange.
VI. CONCLUSION
The appearance of carriers is one step further in the specialization process that allows increasing
advantages  from  trade.  This  process  is  possible  because  of  the  economies  of  scale  in28
transportation  cost  that  allows  producers  to  increase  aggregate  production  to  be  distributed
among  the  population.  Consequently,  individuals  obtain  a  higher  level  of  consumption  and
welfare. Without trust, this process causes frictions among individuals that are overcome with the
appearance of a medium of exchange.
Notice  that  although  the  individual  who  bears  a  particular  cost  (meeting,  search,
perishability or transportation cost) depends on the assumptions of the model, it is clear that as
the  economy  becomes  more  complex,  the  bearing  of  the  costs  becomes  more  specialized.
Different costs are shifted among agents as the economy evolves, allowing producers to increase
their production and individuals’ utility levels.
The Table below shows how this displacement takes place. In a primitive barter economy,
the producer bears all costs, transaction, perishability, search and  transportation  cost.  As  the
population grows, merchants appear and assume search and transaction costs. Perishability and
transportation  costs  are  still  borne  by  producers.  As  the  population  grows  even  more,  it  is
profitable  for  some  individuals  to  become  carriers  and  assume  transportation  costs.  The
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An important feature of this model is that, by lowering transaction costs, the emergence of money
brings about the creation of new goods which allows the economy to grow beyond the limitation
imposed by the barter exchange system and increases individuals’ welfare. In other words, the
appearance  of  money  causes  an  increase  in  the  production,  the  scope  of  the  economy  and
individuals’ welfare. Notice, however, that once the economy has become a monetary economy,
an increase in the amount of money does not affect the aggregate production, the scope of the
economy and individuals’ welfare, i.e., it becomes neutral.
Notice also that, since Q = 2gA, from (17) and (19a) we obtain
Y = [γ + (1 - δ0) (ξ −1)] µ A N.
From this and (19a) we see that both GNP and the scope of the economy are determined by the
population size and transaction cost parameters, which include transportation costs. Individuals’
welfare is determined also by these variables and by the perishability rate of Λ goods too.
On the other hand, in the monetary economy, producers’ prices are proportional to the
amount of money. Notice, however, that the carrier and merchant’s markup are not affected by
the  amount  of  money  but  by  the  transportation  and  transaction  costs.  Nevertheless,  the
perishability rate of money (the Φ good) does affect the carrier’s markup, as becomes evident
from (21).
It is noteworthy that the existence of several low transportation cost goods belonging to
the  set  Φ  can  give  rise  to  several  mediums  of  exchange.  This  conclusion  is  supported  by
anthropological findings of primitive economies in which several goods simultaneously served as
mediums of exchange. Some examples of these are the use of shells and teeth as money in the
Solomon Islands, barley and silver in Babylon and Assyria, shells and silk in China, and several
metals in many ancient societies. An extensive list of examples is given in Einzig (1966). Over
time, as the technology improved and new goods were discovered, those goods with a lower30
perishability rate and transportation cost dominated other goods as mediums of exchange, as our
model  predicts.  This  was  the  case  of  gold  and  silver  that  were  w i d e l y  u s e d  a s  m e d i u m s  o f
exchange as soon as technical progress allowed them to give utility to individuals, and some
other physical properties like measurability and divisibility.
In the process of the appearance of coinage and modern money, other factors, such as the
difficulty of accurately measuring the values of those goods used as money, led to the appearance
of  some  “unified  and  certified  money”  through  the  seal  of  a  reputable  authority  or  a  King.
However, other forms of primitive money existed long before that.
The  absence  of  a  central  authority  can  explain  why,  after  the  disappearance  of  the
currency during the German hyperinflation episode, many objects with similar characteristics
were used as mediums of exchange. Although none of them clearly dominated the others in this
role, it is clear that the economy did not go back to a barter system but to a commodity money
system where many goods where used for that purpose. Another characteristic enhancing this
result is that, in modern economies, the scope of the economy is too large to allow a barter
economy to work; modern economies would never go back to barter as a general system.
Note also that in the model, money appears as a way of overcoming frictions among
rational individuals wanting to do business, and not as a means to solve the absence of the double
coincidences of wants problem. However, it is necessary that the economy reach a certain level
of production technology and population size before this evolution takes hold. Another important
point in this model is that the increase in transportation technology allows the growth in both the
number of goods produced and the individuals’ welfare.
Observe  that,  unlike  the  merchant  barter  economy,  in  this  monetary  economy
transportation costs are reflected in the carriers’ markups and not in the producers’ prices. Note
that for a certain population size and technology, it is optimal that a barter economy instead of a31
monetary economy emerges. This may explain why some societies, such as Ancient Egypt or the
Incas in Peru, did not advance to a monetary economy. Einzig (1966, pp. 194 and 338) provides a
comprehensive analysis of the exchange system in these two great societies.
Finally, the model provides microfoundations to the Cash in Advance constraint, since it
is optimal for individuals to adopt money as medium of exchange once the economy evolves
from  barter  to  a  monetary  one.  However,  as  emphasized  in  Lucas  (1980),  the  use  of  this
restriction is supported only as long as there is a role for intermediaries in the economy.
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